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Insurance companies will pay out an estimated $50 billion in claims as a result of
the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks. The enormous consequences of the attacks to
both the local and national economy surprised many and have raised concerns about the
cost o f such events. Predicting the occurrence and economic cost of terrorist attacks is
fundamentally different than predicting the occurrence and economic cost of natural
disasters. The cost o f natural disasters is more predictable and often can be accurately
estimated using historical data. Even losses from typical kinds o f crime such as burglary
show predictable patterns.
Both the frequency o f and the magnitude o f cost events are typically thought to
approximate a bell-shaped curve, with the high point of the curve representing usual or
customary loss. Occasionally, an infrequent event will occur near the tail o f the curve,
but these are the exceptions. Even when a tail-event occurs, typically there is no
conscious design to make the event’s damage more severe. In stark contrast, a terrorist
event, however, does not follow predictable patterns. In addition, when damage does
occur, the damage is purposely designed to be a tail-event, although terrorists, like all

humans, occasionally fail, but the cost distribution can be expected to exhibit pronounced
kurtosis.
Since the events of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, more attention has
been focused on the economic consequences of terrorism. This research explores the
legal and economic issues of estimating the cost of a terrorist threat. The primary focus
o f the research concerns a threat to a large public venue such as a convention
center/arena. Estimating the cost of a terrorist threat in this context is a multidisciplinary
effort involving, at a minimum, economists, accountants, lawyers, and experts on
security/terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION
There are many types of risks to which businesses are exposed and every business
should consider the possibility o f and subsequent cost associated with each potential risk.
Some risks are commonly understood and in some cases expected, for example, legal
suits, theft, and vandalism. All commonly encountered risks are insurable and thus allow
management o f risk to be a predictable expense. In this regard, few industries have
become as adept in predicting future loss potential than the insurance industry. The
management o f risk for most businesses is enhanced by their knowledge o f historical
patterns of risk. As historical patterns change, especially when change is quick, the
science of prediction becomes more difficult.
The Insurance Services Office (ISO) notes:
In the nine years and ten months from January 1989 to October
1998, the United States property/casualty insurance industry suffered an
inflation-adjusted $98.0 billion in catastrophic losses - 101.2% more than
the inflation-adjusted $48.7 billion in catastrophic losses during the 39
years from January 1950 to December 1988 (Insurance Services Office
1999)”.'
As can be seen, historical loss patterns are increasing sharply. These losses
primarily are accrued from natural disasters, such as hurricane Hugo in 1989, the
Northridge earthquake in 1994, and hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in 1992.2 Historically,
property/casualty catastrophic loss primarily has been associated with acts of nature. The

ISO is an independent company that provides risk decision products and services for the insurance
industry. Their website is located at:
http://www.iso.com
The same report discussed above also notes ISO defines catastrophes as events that cause $25 million or
more in direct insured losses to property and that affect a significant number of insureds and insurers.
2
Some in the insurance industry believe that weather related natural disasters are increasing both in
frequency and in intensity because of human action induced global warming.
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rise in terrorist activity against the United States, culminating in the September 11, 2001
al Quaida attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon using airliners-as*
3
missiles, is changing that view.
•

The 9-11 event is referred to many times in this research, but it is important to
note there is little a building owner (public or private) can do to prevent the style of
catastrophic incident that 9-11 exemplifies (Archibald, Jamison et al. 2002). Prevention
measures o f this kind can only be done by the federal government. The 9-11 event,
nevertheless, serves as an example of the consequences experienced when insufficient
prevention occurs.
Until 9-11, examples of other recent notable terrorist attacks on American soil
include the 1993 basement garage truck bombing of the WTC and the 1995 street truck
bombing o f the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. These events, in
combination with other al Quaida attacks overseas, and especially 9-11, have heightened
awareness o f problems associated with catastrophic risk, especially those resulting from
acts o f terror.
This research considers the cost implications for an economic entity facing a
terroristic threat. The nexus of the problem is risk quantification. How, specifically,
does an economic entity, public or private, estimate the cost of a terrorist threat? The

3
The September 11, 2001 WTC and Pentagon attacks will be referred to as “9-11” in this research.
The al Quaida is a terrorist organization with no defined central location but having many cells scattered
around the world. The al Quaida springs from the fundamentalist portion of Islam and is particularly
concerned with Western influences on the Muslim world. A fourth plane hijacked by al Quaida, with a
target now believed to be the USA Capitol Building, was crashed in Pennsylvania as an unfortunate
consequence of the passenger’s rescue attempts. According to an Associated Press article printed in the
09/09/02 evening edition of the Omaha World Herald newspaper, 2,801 people are either dead or missing
as a result of the WTC attack alone.
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problem o f cost estimation can be viewed from the vantage point of an economic entity
who has just received a threat and subsequently is trying to predict pending cost, or from
the vantage point o f an entity who has already survived a threat and now is trying to
capture cost ex post. Regardless o f the strength of an objective attempt to estimate cost
ex ante or ex post, subjectivity is unavoidable. This research considers both ex ante and
ex post cost estimation issues, although is primarily concerned with the former.
There are seemingly endless examples of economic entities which could be used
to focus such a discussion. Since most terroristic threats, however, tend to be directed
toward so-called landmark structures having social and political significance, used by a
large number o f people, and being of significant economic importance, this research will
use a convention center/arena (CC/A) as the focal point for discussion.4 The general
question is: "What is the cost of a terroristic threat?”. To be more instructive, I
specifically append “ to a CC/A” at the end of the previous question.

CC/As, by the nature of their business, act as hosts for the general public, additional cost issues
arise that can be used for illustration and expanded discussion.
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PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
MACRO VIEW OF TERRORIST IMPACTS
GDP Impacts
Calculating the total economic impact o f an event like 9-11 is complicated by the
vastness and diversity o f damage to the economy. In addition to obvious direct costs, like
physical damage, there are a number o f indirect costs. Consider productivity costs as an
example. These costs may include (but certainly are not limited to) handling extra
paperwork, stricter access requirements, additional employee drills, training, and
counseling. These new indirect costs erode profits. Many of these costs can be hidden
from traditional measures of the economy. Another subtle source of economic loss is the
postponement o f investment decisions. After 9-11, the expected rate of return for many
projects probably went down as a result of security costs both to the specific project and
the broader economy.
The difficulty in objectively measuring the impact can be seen by observing the
wide variance in cost estimates of the attacks. A simple Internet search produces
numerous estimates that vary in the billions of dollars. Part of the problem is determining
what, exactly, should be included in the measure. How many indirect costs should be
included? For example, should cost of an economic stimulus package be included?
Osama bin Laden, the titular head o f al Quaida and wayward ascetic son of a
Yameni construction magnate who made billions serving the Saudi Royal Family, is
widely quoted as estimating the cost o f 9-11 at SI trillion. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF), however, often is quoted as estimating the total impact, both direct and
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indirect at 0.75% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) or $76.5 billion.5 According to U.S.
Treasury Secretary Paul O ’Neill, the lack o f available terrorism insurance for U.S.
businesses is beginning to impact the broader economy with a cost equal to 1% of the
gross domestic product (Kopecki 2002).6 The cost o f terrorism is often expressed as a
percent o f GDP, and as such implies a reoccurring nature. In fact, when comparing
disparate estimates o f damage, care must be taken to establish the width o f time frame
used. For example, The Comptroller o f New York estimates the total impact o f the WTC
attacks to New York City to be as much as $95 billion, but extends the loss period to the
end o f 2004 (Thompson 2002).
As time passes, the cost of terrorism may become a more specific, line-item entry
in both national and business budgets.
Impacted Industries
Dramatic economic problems often have a rippling effect causing impact to the
broader economy. Even events given much less coverage than 9-11, like the corporate
accounting scandals o f 2001 and 2002 can have profound impacts.7 When Enron

5
The IMF website is located at:
http://www.imf.orig/
ABC News Online discusses the report in more detail.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/business/2001/12/item20011228201738 l.htm

http://www.pe.eom/n;
Visited 20 July 2002.
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announced it had overstated earnings in November 2001, share price dropped under $4
from a high over $90, thus erasing billions in shareholder equity and retirement accounts.
The Enron accounting debacle is widely considered to be part o f the reason for the stock
market pullback that started in January and February 2002. The profoundly higher cost
of 9-11 make it hard to imagine an economic entity not impacted. There are,
nevertheless, some businesses with more severe impacts.
The entire hospitality industry was/is among the most severely impacted, and
within this industry subset, perhaps the airline industry was the hardest hit. When
regulators closed off air travel for four days, the airline industry lost nearly $1.5 billion
(Reynolds 2002). A working paper from the Federal Reserve Bank o f St. Louis concisely
summarizes the problem.
The events o f 9/11 curtailed airline travel in various ways. First, these
events reduced the demand for air travel as a result of the increased
concerns about safety. Second, these events reduced air travel by
exacerbating the mild recession that began in March 2001. Third, the cost
o f travel was effectively increased because o f the necessity o f arriving
earlier for departures and the increased delays because o f security
breaches. The result was substantially less air travel for both work and
leisure purposes (Coughlin, Cohen et al. 2002).
Coughlin, et al., goes on to note a dramatic 30% drop in revenue passenger miles during
September 2001 as compared to the previous September, and traffic was still down 15%
year-over-year in December 2001. The losses were not transient. The world's largest
airline, AMR, the parent o f American Airlines, posted a second quarter 2002 loss o f $495
million and expected to be in the red for some time. Compared with the same quarter of
2001, revenues for the quarter were off 20%, passenger traffic was off 11%, and
American Airline's average fares were off 9.5% (McCartney 2002).

7

The decline experienced by the airline industry is just part o f the broader impacts
to the hospitality industry. The head o f the NYC & Company, (the name for the
Convention and Visitors Bureau in New York), said the official post-9-11 forecast of
visitors to New York included a 14% drop (5.4 million people) in 2001 as compared to
2000. Also forecasted is a corresponding drop in spending o f 12% or $2.1 billion (NYC
& Company 2001).
A national survey o f hotel general managers by Cornell University indicated more
than a third of general managers noted a decline in average room rates, and 42.7% had
experienced group cancellations due to the events o f 9-11. The general managers
perceived a declining hotel market even before the attacks, which made the 9-11 impacts
even more severe. All of the general managers responding to the survey said they had
laid off employees (Taylor and Enz 2002). A more recent analysis of the hotel industry
by Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, a New York consulting group, postponed the hotel industry
recovery until 2004 due to continuing stock market declines and lingering travel jitters
[from 9-11] (Bannon 2002).
The Travel Business Roundtable o f Leading Economic Indicators declined at a
seasonally-adjusted rate of 8.4% after 9-11, and the drop is noted as the most significant
monthly drop this index has experienced (Travel Business Roundtable 2001).8 According
to industry analyst, Rob Reynolds, tour operators experienced a 60% decline in travel
bookings after 9-11 (Reynolds 2002).

8
The Travel Business Roundtable is an independent organization whose purpose is to educate,
especially legislative leaders, regarding issues important to the travel and tourism industry. The cited
report is one of many statistics they produce. The Travel Business Roundtable Website is located at.
http://www.tbr.org/
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The restaurant business also suffered. A news release from the National
Restaurant Association reported the overall negative impact o f 9-11 to eating and
drinking businesses as exceeding $1 billion in September 2001 (National Restaurant
Association 2002). The release goes on to note, however, by November, monthly sales
volume returned to pre-attack levels while total employment remained below pre-9-11
levels.
All o f the hospitality impacts discussed above are particularly important within
the context o f a Convention Center/Arena (CC/A). If we assume the patronage o f a
CC/A to be composed of both local and regional business, common sense dictates an
expected, more-severe impact to the regional component when the overall hospitality
industry experiences a shock like 9-11. As an example, consider one o f the main staples
o f a CC/A: tradeshows.
Tradeshow Week maintains detailed statistics regarding the tradeshow industry
which they publish in their Quarterly Report o f Tradeshow Statistics. Their third-quarter
2001 report (containing the 9-11 event), indicated the largest decrease ever recorded in
the 29-year history o f the report (Tradeshow Week 2001). According to the report,
professional attendance was the hardest hit, down 7.5% compared with 2000 figures.
Exhibiting company participation and net square footage also dropped. This record
decrease was immediately broken by the fourth-quarter statistics when professional
attendance dropped 20.4% from the same period in 2000 {Tradeshow Week 2002).
Dramatic decreases in the airline and hotel industry translate into dramatic declines for
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the tradeshow business which, in turn, represent a significant component o f CC/A
revenue.
Lifestyle Impacts
Shortly after 9-11, numerous commentators were quick to note the American
lifestyle will forever be changed by the event. More people, for example, now are
nervous about staying in high-rise lodging establishments, and when they do stay, they
request a low floor by an exit (Kelly 2002). In like manner, the anthrax-infected letters
anonymously sent to members of Congress and the media shortly after 9-11 were widely
reported as making people afraid to open their mail, or to send their children to school.
The changes in lifestyle resulting from a terrorist act are numerous.
One o f the problems with dollar-value measurement o f damage is the inability to
accurately capture adverse lifestyle impacts, especially emotional impacts. While there
may be universal agreement an event like 9-11 causes profound and widespread
emotional trauma, how that trauma is costed on an individual basis, and subsequently
summed to create a total, is more a matter of conjecture than science. The individual
impacts are, nevertheless, present. Rand Corp did a survey shortly after the 9-11 attacks
asking participants qualitative questions typically used to evaluate stress level9. They
found 90% percent of adults surveyed experienced at least some degree of stress, and
44% reported a substantial level o f a post-traumatic stress symptom (Schuster, Stein et al.
2001 ).

Questions asked by Rand attempted to qualitatively measure such things as disturbing memories
of the event, reduced ability to concentrate, trouble sleeping, and irritability.
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The problem of measuring emotional discomfort is similar to the problem o f
measuring loss o f enjoyment or pleasure. The crux of this problem is highlighted in the
hedonic damages debate. Hedonic damage measurement essentially is an attempt to
measure the value of a human life.10 Those purporting such a value is measurable
typically use some indirect measure, e.g., finding what some economic entity spends to
avoid a casualty. In the context of providing expert witness testimony on economic
damages, Martin does an excellent job in pointing out the flaws with this approach.
Unfortunately, the range of values is so large as to be nearly without
value. The Consumer Product Safety Commission values life at $70,000
while the Food and Drug Administration sets it at $132,000,000. A range
such as this is absolutely worthless to a jury, so most economists [who
support the belief hedonic damages can be measured] do not include these
two studies in their examples, but put the range somewhere between $1
and $8 million (Martin and Vavoulis 2002).
Applying a specific dollar value to human life raises another philosophical problem. For
any specific, agreed-upon value, there is an implication that the reasonable person would
be immediately willing to give up his/her life for that sum of money. Common sense
dictates a rational person would not give up their life for any sum of money.11
Lastly, many economists believe a market is required to perform the
measurement.12 Without a market, there are no measures, only estimates of what the
market would yield. According to these economists, without a market measure, an expert
opinion is dubious at best. This is not meant to suggest consideration o f hedonic
Hedonic damage is a distinct measure of the loss of life, itself, and not to be confused with other
kinds of loss, such as loss of consortium or pain and suffering.
11
This leaves open the notion rational people are willing to die in certain circumstances, e.g. to
defend a loved one or closely held belief. While money may be a significant factor in justifying such
sacrifice, money is not either the sole or the primary cause of the sacrifice.
12
A market is an institution or mechanism which brings together buyers (“demanders”) and sellers
(“suppliers”) of particular goods and services (McConnell and Brue, 1993).
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damages is always without merit. To illustrate, note that the U.S.A. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) often conducts benefit/cost analysis regarding new drugs. If the
FDA approves a new drug which includes the rare possibility o f a death, then the FDA
essentially has valued the death at the level of benefit. This administrative agency use of
legislative power is not the same as economist's expert opinion. An economic expert
witness assists the judicial trier o f fact because economic theory and tools of analysis
provide a gain in precision. If the issue in question is substantially subjective, rather than
objective, then the issue belongs within the ken of the jury. Hedonic damages can be
wholly appropriate for the FDA and simultaneously wholly inappropriate for an
economic expert in a courtroom.
Examples of Economic Impact From a Terrorist Threat
Two high-profile sporting events occurred shortly after 9-11, Super Bowl XXXVI
and the 2002 Winter Olympics13. Both examples are at once good and bad examples for
use in discussing the cost of a terrorist threat. They are good in the sense they highlight
the enormity o f spending required to secure a geographically and physically large venue.
They are bad examples because both events are so hugely profiled as to make them far
more attractive to terrorists than regular CC/A-like venues in ordinary operations, and as
such, require disproportional higher levels o f protection. Both events were prominent
enough to be designated as National Special Security Events (NSSE).14 The secrecy

13
Super Bowl XXXVI was held on February 3, 2002 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The 2002 Winter
Olympics opened on February 8, 2002 in Salt Lake City, Utah.
14
National Special Security Events may be designated under Title 18 of the United States Code.
Such a designation allows the Secret Service to help with security. There only have been a dozen NSSE
designations since the legislation was enacted. For online access to the Federal Register go to:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/aces/aces 140.html
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surrounding the security o f NSSE events precludes getting accurate security spending
information. The cost of these security efforts may have been significantly defrayed by
the United States government.
The previous caveats not withstanding, the cost o f providing security for Super
Bowl XXXVI was rumored to be approximately double that o f Super Bowl XXXV. Milt
Ahlerich, the NFL’s vice president of security, for example, was quoted as saying
spending was more than double what was spent in the past (Powers 2002).15 One article
puts the total security cost o f Super Bowl XXXVI at $40 million, although the article is
not clear whether this includes the cost o f Secret Service help (Horrow 2002). The
rumored doubling o f spending is at least partially substantiated by New Orleans Mayor
Marc Morial who hinted the 600 police officers on hand was double those on hand for the
Super Bowl in 1997 (Bell 2002).
Security at the 2002 Winter Olympics was reported to cost $310 million, and was
nearly three times what the Atlanta organizers spent on security in 1996 for the Summer
Olympics, even though the Summer Olympics had four times as many athletes and events
(Zeigler 2002). As with Super Bowl XXXVT, it is unclear whether NSSE support is
included in this cost. Needless to say, the staggering security costs discussed above
would loom largely on a balance sheet.
Overseeing the security for a single event or a series o f events with a fixed
duration may involve less security expense than if the economic entity were ongoing.
The United States Postal Service, for example, suffered severe and ongoing losses from
15
past.

The article is not clear whether Ahlerich refers to the most recent past, or to games several years
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the 9-11 and post-9-11 anthrax attacks. Postmaster General John Potter advised Congress
the cost would be about $2 billion in lost revenues and $3 billion for anthrax cleanup and
sanitation equipment (Kestin 2001). There is undoubtedly a reoccurring component to
these costs.
UNDERSTANDING THE TERRORIST RISK
The Source of Risk
A detailed root cause analysis o f terrorism is beyond the scope of this work,
however, a short, high-level review o f theory may be helpful to understand forces that
predictably change the potential for terrorist acts. Research on terrorism can be focused
at different levels:
In much o f the existing research on terrorism, explanations have focused
on the individual and group level. These aim primarily at providing
psychological explanations, such as identifying why individuals join a
terrorist group. Explanations at the societal or national level primarily
attempt to identify causal relationships between certain historical, cultural
and socio-political characteristics of society and the occurrence of
terrorism. Explanations at the systemic or international level seek to
establish causal relationships between characteristics o f the international
state system and relations between states on the one hand, and the
occurrence o f international terrorism on the other (Lia and Hansen 2000).
When reduced to simplest form, those inclined to commit terrorist acts often, but not
always, are motivated by economic disparity, political difference, and/or ideological
difference.16 Terrorism inspired out of ideological difference often is considered the
most dangerous because ideologically-motivated terrorists typically are less constrained

When so motivated the terrorist's terrorism can not accomplish the desired objective directly (e.g.,
terrorism does not redistribute wealth). Instead, the terrorism must unravel the existing social fabric on the
hope that the reconstructed social fabric will be more consistent with the terrorist's objective (e.g.,
ideological purity) While social fabric is plastic in nature, quite often it is spun from a thread with a very
resilient memory.
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by fear o f mass casualties or the euphemistically-labeled collateral damage. As with all
maneuvers in war, terrorism is about leveraging limited assets into effective pressure
(Sun-tzu 1994). The terrorist defines "collateral damage" differently than the traditional
army: but both seek to minimize it.17 Effective pressure for the terrorist often is
measured by fundamental political change. Thus, the terrorist actively seeks to maximize
what a traditional army would label "collateral damage" both to tie down that army and to
stimulate the political processes to accede to the terrorist's worldview.
Modem society also has unintentionally made terrorism easier by providing a
high-tech environment where communication, travel, and shared sources o f knowledge
are more easily attained.18 The latter can be used to gather intelligence regarding a
possible target and to create or procure weapons. Ease of communication is meant to
include not only personal communication,19 but also the modem media which devotes
massive and immediate publicity to terrorist acts. An article written about mass media
coverage o f 9-11 reports, polls and surveys indicated between 99% and 100% of all

A modem traditional army may deliberately seek, in some contexts, what is traditionally defined
as collateral damage. A modem army first seeks to eliminate the command and control (C&C) structure of
the opponent army. The opponent army's C&C structure almost always is interdependent with the civilian
infrastructure. Eliminating the opponent army's C&C supply of electricity typically has as an immediate
and predictable consequence the termination of pumping facilities for the urban water supply. This was
seen in Baghdad, Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. Additionally, a modem army may deliberately decimate
the civilian infrastructure so as to prevent that civilian population from resupplying the opponent army
and/or to force the opponent army to divert its existing supplies towards the civilian population. This was
seen in General Sherman's 1864-1865 March through Georgia and South Carolina during the USA's Civil
War.
18
Of course, to some extent, the technology of modem society also has provided better means of
detecting and thwarting terrorist acts. It remains to be seen whether the gain in defensive detection is
greater than, equal to, or less than the gains in the facilitation of terrorist action frequency and magnitude of
consequence. However, history teaches that every defense can be defeated.
19
Proponents of surveillance insist that such surveillance must be effective to the task. However,
surveillance that can detect nefarious plots also, of necessity, tramples upon the privacy of the innocent and
the formerly free. The terrorist who seeks a closed society "wins" just by prompting this defensive
measure.
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Americans followed initial news of the attacks (Nacos 2002)20 With regard to 9-11, the
media not only provided round-the-clock coverage of the disaster itself, but also gave air
time to Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants via videotapes made available through the
independent Middle Eastern television network Al-Jazeera. Many other U.S.A. domestic
TV programs aired having a “why do they hate us” theme. As can be seen, terrorists use
the media as a free and easy platform to promote their views.
Terrorist Groups
At the time o f this writing during the year 2002, ideologically-focused terrorist
groups based in the Middle East are considered the most likely source for potential
terrorist acts, although historically many disparate groups having different motivations
and operating in different countries also have used terrorism to advance their goals.21
Middle Eastern groups include:
Hizballah, a radical Shia Islamic Group in Lebanon that has committed
numerous anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli attacks; HAMAS (Islamic Resistance
Movement) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, both of which use terrorism in
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israeli in order to undermine Middle East
peace negotiations and to establish an Islamic Palestinian state; the Abu
Sayyaf Group, which is a radical Islamic Separatist group operating in the
southern Philippines; Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), which is
based in Egypt and seeks the overthrow of the Egyptian government; and
the Armed Islamic Group, which is based in Algeria and seeks to
overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state
(Simon 2002).

20
The article appeared in the Spring 2002 quarterly publication of Phi Kappa Phi. Phi Kappa Phi is
an honorary society whose stated purpose is the recognition and encouragement of superior scholarship in
all fields of study.
21
Examples from the U.S.A. domestic front include the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the
Animal Liberation Front which is the radical splinter from PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals). Many, especially is the Muslim Middle East, would point to the post World War II creation of
the State of Israel as a successful use of terrorism for political gain.

16

The religious fundamentalism o f the typical Middle Eastern terrorist organizations
poses a more likely threat to CC/As and their venues for at least two reasons. First,
terrorist groups domestic to the United States typically are more cause or issue-focused,
such as environmental protection, animal rights, or anti-abortion activism. The targets of
a cause-motivated terrorist typically are highly specific and symbolic, e.g., a chemical
plant or an abortion clinic. Unless a CC/A is a venue hosting a targeted cause, the
likelihood of attack from these terrorist groups is low. Second, one of the professed
targets of religiously-motivated Middle Eastern terrorists groups is the American
entertainment industry. The ideology of these terrorists regards the entertainment
industry as decadent and sinful.
The Role of Ideology in Terrorist’s Target Selection22
Acts o f terrorism are often referred to as indiscriminate or random. That is true
with respect to the perception o f the attacked populace, but most often it is not random
with respect to the attacking terrorist. Terrorists almost always choose targets whose
destruction is warranted by the ideology of the terrorist and whose destruction is
perceived beneficial to their cause. The terrorist act is random in the sense terrorists
often do not know who their specific victims will be.23
Ideology is a dominant factor behind most terrorist attacks. Through ideology
victims o f terrorist acts are dehumanized in the mind of the terrorist, as the terrorist either
blames them as the source of the terrorist’s plight, or an aid to someone who is.

22
The material in this section borrows heavily from an article written by C. J. Drake (2002).
23
Military across the globe recognize that the ability to kill is enhanced if the target is dehumanized
as the hated Other instead of a specific and known human.
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According to terrorist’s ideology, the victims’ alleged guilt merits punishment, and
simultaneously absolves the terrorist of any wrongdoing.
Most terrorist ideologies are sufficiently stringent as to apply blame to anyone or
any thing even marginally associated with the target24 So, for example, a construction
worker helping to build an entertainment facility is already “guilty by association,” and as
such a justifiable target in the mind the terrorist. Using this example, also note the
desirability o f the construction worker as a target may be enhanced because this target is
probably less hardened than the specific object of the terrorist’s wrath.
Summary of Recent Terrorist Acts
Appendix A contains information in graphical form regarding the frequency,
location, and intended target of terrorist attacks.25 Although the perceived threat of
terrorism has risen substantially since 9-11, recent historical statistics regarding terrorism
are less ominous. During the five-year period beginning in 1995 and ending in 2000,
there were only fifteen terrorist attacks in North America and only seven casualties.26
Internationally, 77 United States citizens were killed during the period and 651 were
wounded. Although 9-11 certainly skewed the casualty figures, numerically speaking,
the odds of a terrorist attack to most U.S.A. located businesses as based on historical
statistics are slim.

24
During the U.S. A.'s racial unrest of the 1960's, the Black Panther leader H. Rap Brown noted: "If
you aren't part of the solution, then you are part of the problem." as well as "Violence is as American as
apple pie." In 2002, H. Rap Brown, then living under the post-conversion name of Jamil Abdullah AlAmin, was convicted of murder of a police officer.
25
The data in this section were obtained from the United States Department of State located at:
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/245 l.htm
26
Note that these dates exclude al Quaida's first attack on the WTC (i.e., basement truck bomb), but
include its attacks on the American embassies in Africa. Also see Appendix A for data and graphs.
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MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
A11 Threats Are Not the Same
Quantification of the cost o f a threat depends heavily on quantification of the
threat itself. The concept of quantifying threats will be discussed in more detail in a later
section, but for now, note a high-level classification o f threat potential would consider
whether the threat was routine (or unspecified), indirect, or direct.
When preparing to quantify the cost of a terroristic threat, it may be reasonable to
include the routine cost o f protection. Economic entities routinely budget for security
threats, even in the absence of a direct threat. This implies a constant, nonspecific level
of threat is always present. Since 9-11, the concept of routine has changed. Routine now
and in the future is more, perhaps much more, than routine before 9-11.
A routine security budget is composed of those security expenditures common to
most businesses. With regard to a CC/A, many expenditures are considered boiler plate
and would vary in size only with prevailing general perceptions o f threat potential.
Quantifying the cost of such a routine threat in this circumstance likely is easier than
when the threat is more specific, because of the assumption o f minimal impact to revenue
streams. When the threat is routine (i.e. vague or unspecified), the cost of a threat may
roughly be computed by subtracting last year’s security budget from the current year’s
budget.
The situation gets more complicated when the threat is more specific. Since 9-11,
for example, the United States government has issued several indirect warnings regarding
the possibility o f a terrorist attack. These warnings only specify a category of target (e.g.,
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bridges). In like manner, a possibility exists a generalized, indirect threat could be issued
to CC/A’s in general, but to none in specific. In this indirect scenario, security spending
by CC/A’s presumably would rise disproportionately to entertainment/business facilities
in general, and there may be additional impacts in the form of lost business. Obviously, a
direct threat, leveled at a specific CC/A, would precipitate the most security spending, as
well as impact revenue streams.
The amount o f spending required to meet a threat also depends, at a minimum, on
the terrorist or terrorist organization alleged to be the perpetrator, the credibility o f the
source reporting the threat, and whether or not significant free help is available from
government sources.27 The former gives insight whether the terrorist threat has the
required resources and expertise available to carry out the threat.
Additional Economic Impact Contingents
A major determinate o f what an economic entity will spend to defend against a
terrorist threat is the consequence of what would happen if insufficient spending occurs.
With regard to a CC/A, insufficient security spending after a credible security threat
becomes known may result in a reduction in event bookings and attendance as people
avoid the facility because o f safety concerns.28 Reductions in security conceivably
increase the chances o f a terrorist act, and in the event one occurs, damage to reputation
and future business may be large and unrecoverable. The potential for civil damages also
are present. As consequences become more profound, the potential for greater cost

27
Note security provided by the government is not free, but rather becomes a taxpayer-born
externality to the economic entity receiving it.
28
Safety concerns include not only personal safety concerns but also concerns about the hassles
caused by increased security, e.g., baggage checks and longer lines at gates.
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increases. How much cost increases is a function o f how risk averse the entity is, which
is a determinate o f security spending. O f course, as with any discounted present value
analysis, those costs or revenues that are recognized earlier in time will have a far greater
impact on the present value o f profitability. Additionally, when those remote in time
events also are small probability events, then the present value analysis o f profitability
nearly will eliminate those costs from the calculation o f profit.
A second factor to consider is the kind of event the terrorist has either threatened
to use or is presumed to use. According to the renowned billionaire investor Warren
Buffet29, who has substantial investments in the reinsurance industry, the most likely risk
is terrorists introducing a biological agent into the ventilation system o f a large office
building (Shim 2002).30 Buffet also notes insurance companies now are excluding such
risks, as well as nuclear and chemical risks. The perception o f likely risk from these
sources is a departure from what history would teach. Terrorists typically have used
bombs, arson, and armed attack as their primary tools o f destruction. Today, however,
may be a new day with new risks.
Thirdly, terrorist’s targets differ with respect to hardness. An entity consisting
mostly of intellectual property (IP) faces fewer of the traditional security issues than a
brick and mortar concern, especially if the latter occupies a large amount of space and

Warren Buffet is the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, a large holding company. Berkshire
Hathaway’s website is at:
http: //www.berkshirehathawav.com/
30
Note that some forms of modem terrorism do not include the destructive physical damage
associated with bombs and arson. Bioterror attacks and hacking attacks to IT (Information Technology)
resources leave physical plant intact but still generate significant psychological effect and/or financial
effect.
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handles large numbers of people.31 The relative hardness o f the target can act as a
deterrent to terrorists. Note, however, hardening further skews the expected negative
outcome by reducing the frequency o f low loss events.
Measuring Economic Impacts
Whatever negative impact results from a terrorist threat, the measurement of the
impact is no simple task. Typically, when a large business or other economic entity
experiences an economic loss, the measurement o f that loss is a multidisciplinary effort.
Gaughan writes:
The skills o f an economist may be invaluable to analyze the relevant
economic environment, do an industry analysis, and construct reliable
projections. A finance expert may be necessary to analyze relevant
variables from financial markets, such as rates o f return. An accountant
may be useful to conduct a costs analysis or to perform other work, such
as the reconstruction of financial statements, including cash flow
statements (Gaughan 2000).
In addition to economists, finance experts, and accountants, there also may be a
need for a marketing expert and a lawyer when determining economic damages.
Marketing experts have knowledge useful in predicting public response to advertising
(e.g., as required to offset a negative event), and, to some extent, what response is likely
to ensue from negative stimuli. With regard to lawyers, if final establishment of damage
requires the use o f the court system, then the entity must note methods and assumptions
used in the determination o f economic damages may vary between legal jurisdictions and
are often subject to interpretation. For example, some jurisdictions permit recovery to the
estate while others limit recovery to dependent survivors (Martin and Vavoulis 2002).

31

Of course, IP embedded in an Internet context can be reduced in value via hacking.
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Requirements like this directly impact the potential size o f losses an economic entity may
face. If the determination of losses becomes the purview of a court, strict rules regarding
the use of scientific evidence are required. A detailed analysis o f each discipline’s role
follows in the next section.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
VALUATION IS A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EFFORT
The Accounting Profession
People unfamiliar with valuation issues often assume accounting to be solely
sufficient to quantify changes in valuation. Accountants are an important part o f the
process, but have limitations. Accountants do not try to capture all costs and
consequently do not capture all costs. The accounting profession focuses upon objective
value, principally derived from transactions. Unless there is a cash flow (or a cost-based
non-cash flow, as in the case of depreciation) resulting from some market transaction,
accountants make no entry on a balance sheet. The strength o f the accounting approach
is that it predictably produces the same result regardless o f the condition under which the
entity is being valued. An economic entity, for example, may be valued as going concern
value, stock market value, or for merger/acquisition value, and this implies the potential
for a differing valuation estimates (Sullivan 2000). As the tenants o f valuation move
further from objective measures, accountants are less likely to measure.
The Finance Profession
The finance profession, likewise, searches for objective value and often finds
valuation to be insufficiently objective. Finance also focuses upon objective value,
especially quantifiable items o f concern, like price, share, and cash flow. An example of
the fringe of sufficiently objective value is the value estimated for the control of an entity
versus minority ownership o f the entity. Conventional wisdom holds acceptable the
addition of a so-called control premium in the valuation process (Abrams 2001).
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Measuring the control premium is beyond the scope of both the typical accountant and
typical financial advisor. Unlike accounting, however, finance will welcome the use of
statistical measures when the firm does not individually engage in a transaction.
The Economic Profession
Economists see value in yet another manner, and notably include subjective
sources of value. Economists examine the utility of an item, initially measured in utils,
but then exchanged for currency and most often measured in dollars. Economists view
utility as the stream o f current and future benefits resulting from ownership of a good or
property. This stream o f objective and subjective benefits is then converted into current
dollars. "Forensic economics" is a specialty field within economics, accounting, and
finance whose goal is to find changes in value often not in the scope o f other business
disciplines, such as placing a value on control of an enterprise (Mitenko and Okleshen
1998). A forensic economist is commonly employed when someone or something has
wrongfully impaired the income producing potential of an asset, and, as such, is
appropriate in the context o f a terrorist threat.
The Marketing Profession
Marketing experts are involved in nearly every aspect o f a CC/A, regardless of
whether a terrorist threat has been given. The marketer’s presence especially is required
during the unstable business climate created by a threat. From an ex ante vantage point,
damage estimation turns on the ability to predict how the public will respond to a threat,
and how the public will respond to marketing attempts to counter the negative effects of a
threat. From an ex post vantage point, the impact of a threat to revenue streams is
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already known, although some contention may exist as to what could have happened if
better management of the threat had occurred.
The Legal Profession
Within the context o f a terroristic threat, the legal profession adds value for
several reasons. First, and perhaps most obvious, the lawyer is expert in identifying
liability risk, the expense of which must be included in the cost o f a threat. Liability risk
has two components that must be managed: legal liability and legal damages.
Frequently, if not always, the decision makers of an economic entity must know both
what their duty o f care is under the law to protect patrons, employees, and others in
attendance, as well as which injuries trigger a legal obligation to compensate the plaintiff.
Many courts, for example, have held that a storekeeper or proprietor o f other commercial
premises is generally liable for the willful criminal acts of a third party whose criminal
acts can be foreseen or anticipated (Caner 1995).

TO

Accordingly, if a proprietor receives a

credible threat, then the threat is foreseeable and creates a mandate for reasonable
preventative actions by the proprietor.
Second, a lawyer may provide useful advice on how to mitigate legal risk.
Generically, under USA law liability flows towards those who control risk. Warning of a
risk can shift some control o f the risk to the customers and mitigate the proprietor's risk.
An example o f risk mitigation might include a decision to advertise the exact nature of
the threat and consequently shift the locus o f the control and the risk.33

32
For an in-depth review of pertinent legal decisions in this area consult the American Law Review
as cited in the bibliography.
33
Of course, such a decision can aversely impact revenue streams in the form of lost business and
consequently would need to be balanced against other potential gains. An event with both low probability
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Lastly, some losses are not generically recognized by the respective local legal
authority, and, if accepted, must be proven using scientific rules o f evidence. This
becomes especially important if the establishment or recovery o f costs is expected via the
courts. All expert testimony is now subject to screening to ensure that it is relevant and
reliable, and the choice of proceedings to make this determination lies within the purview
o f the trial court (Federal Judicial Center 2000).
The Actuarial Profession
Actuarial science, which is most commonly perceived as part o f the insurance
industry, also may be of value when estimating the cost o f a terroristic threat. The
amount o f money an economic entity is willing to spend to mitigate the risk o f such a
threat likely depends on the probability o f occurrence. According to Warren Buffet, for
example, the risk for landmark buildings in New York is 10 times that o f buildings in
less-populated areas (Samples, Miller et al. 2001).34 Presumably, actuarial science was
used to establish this estimate (or they knew they could not know and thus substituted a
quantum jump).
Actuaries potentially are useful estimating risk across varying categories of
entities and structures. The 9-11 incident, however, demonstrated the insurance
industry’s lack o f experience with modem terrorist threats as evidenced by the
unexpected catastrophic losses incurred. A more detailed discussion o f actuarial issues
follows in a later section.
and huge dollars losses that could trigger bankruptcy might be concealed from the public to preserve the
revenue streams on the belief that shifting the locus of control and of risk is not profitable for the
proprietor.
34
The defining attributes of a landmark building versus an average building are not given in this
article.
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The Security Profession
Actuaries focus on objective value as defined by statistics. Actuaries only are, at
best, capable o f predicting the probability o f loss and the probable size o f loss if loss
occurs, and not the specific locus of loss.35 A security expert may add value by
predicting for any specific entity the likely source of threat, the likely modus operandi of
the source, and the specific vulnerabilities to be mitigated. One goal, therefore, of the
security expert is to assess vulnerability.36 The security expert enhances the accuracy of
the actuary's statistical estimates by quantifying items to which the actuary's statistics do
not speak. The analysis performed by the security expert will have cost implications as
recommendations are implemented.
VALUATION ISSUES37
All valuation methods link back to market value. Regardless of the method used
to value an economic entity, the process is complicated both by a volatile market and by
market obsolescence. Conceptually, any valuation turns on the ability to predict present
and future benefits, and to quantify those benefits in present-day dollars. From a
textbook perspective, all o f this sounds rather simple, but, in reality, quantification of
many o f the benefits and discount rates are highly subjective. The subjectiveness o f the
process is further increased as market volatility rises. With regard to a CC/A, income is
35
The problem of predicting both the probability of loss and the probable size of loss if the loss
occurs is that this joint estimation is much harder for manmade sources of disaster than for natural sources
disasters. This issue is explored later with actuarial issues.
36
A high-level example of how the vulnerability assessment process works can be seen by viewing
the Anti-Terrorism Risk Assessment Guide produced by the Governor’s office in North Carolina. This is
available online (visited 08/16/02).
http://www.nccrimecontrol.org/forms/terrorismselfassessment.htm
37
This section borrows heavily from research authored by Greg Ashley, MBA and Michael O’Hara,
J.D., Ph.D. See Works Cited.
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largely based on entertainment-based activities. Conventional wisdom regards
entertainment as a subordinate priority for consumers when the economy is bad and, as
such, income flows presumably are less predictable than for industries providing a staple.
Another issue has to do with obsolescence. Competition to attract sports clubs
and other venues is intense in the CC/A business. Older structures lacking modern
appearance, security, and facilities are at a distinct disadvantage because they are doubly
attractive to the terrorist: they can be softer targets and can allow greater damage.
Valuation Techniques
Smith & Parr (Smith and Parr 2000) discuss at length three methodologies for
valuing assets. These are generically known as the cost, the income, and the market
value approaches. Smith and Parr argue that any other method o f valuation is essentially
a variation on these three.
The cost method is a cost-of-replication approach. The cost method seeks to
calculate how much money would have to be spent in order to replicate by some other
means the exact bundle of benefits being valued. The cost-of-replication approach must
be time sensitive. Obviously, most o f the benefits being replicated are occurring in the
future, and thus require predictions about future cash flows to cost and from revenue.
Theoretically, one could replicate all of the values of any economic entity by purchasing
each component of value separately. With regard to a CC/A, for example, a would-be
customer o f a CC/A attempting to capture the same values o f a CC/A venue could,
among other things, rent floor space at other venues to showcase products, buy
newspaper, radio, and television ads to get exposure, or hire firms who specialize in
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public relations. In theory, no one would pay more for a CC/A venue unless the cost of
the venue was the same as or less than the cumulative cost of buying the values a la
carte.
A criticism o f the cost approach is individual forecasts vary widely on the present
value o f future costs and revenue cash flows. Most going concerns, especially CC/As,
have a large number o f values requiring shopping at many different sources to replace all
o f them. A future cost estimate is required for each source used, and likewise the
opportunity for error is increased. These errors may cumulate rather than offset, thereby
swamping any forecast with its own range of errors. A second criticism o f the cost
approach is its failure to fully account for the risk (to the seller and to the buyer) that the
future may not be as expected. A seller may not receive payment when due and the buyer
may own a nonproducing asset. In other words, if the probability is high that a future
benefit is not received, the cost approach cannot directly provide a lower corresponding
value.
The income method attempts to compute all of the nominal income, present and
future, expected be earned from the entity. If such a dollar figure can be found, then the
buyer need only do a NPV (net present value) to arrive at current-dollar worth.
Assuming the prospective buyer already knows the cash outlay required to purchase the
entity, an internal rate o f return (IRR) can then be computed. The IRR can be used by the
buyer to compare perceived risk with rate of return. In this manner, the income approach
addresses the risk issue better than the cost method. The income method suffers from
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many o f the same problems as the cost method, however, the income method offers the
additional insight o f the reward for risk issue.
The market value method seeks to avoid the unavoidable uncertainties and
subjective inputs o f the building blocks approaches inherent to the cost method and the
income method. Instead, the market value method looks to the market for similar
transactions and takes those market prices as a proxy for the value of the present
transaction. In theory, any entity could be valued by this approach. One needs merely to
find similar market transactions. Obviously, subjective inputs are not eliminated, merely
moved from the future to the present. However, once equivalent transactions are
identified, theory dictates that the amount of money that exchanged hands should be close
in value.
The market value method is the preferred method of valuation when like
transactions are rare, for example, naming rights deals. The preference for the market
value method may have different motivations. For example, the preference for the
market value method may reflect recognition o f the inherent flaws in the cost and the
income methods, or may reflect reluctance to incur the workload necessitated by the cost
and the income methods, or may reflect lack o f confidence and a willingness to trust the
past efforts o f others.
The market value method is criticized because transactions often are not
sufficiently similar and because there are too few transactions in the marketplace to
provide a representative sample. The market value approach requires arms'-length
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transactions, and a lack o f an arms'-length transaction would in turn require compensating
adjustments to maintain the accuracy of the market value method.
Valuation of Intangible Assets
The traditional method of valuing a business is mainly concerned with three
economic components commonly referred to as plant, property, and equipm ent38 These
are all tangible assets. A business is assumed by this method to be a combination of
buildings, land, equipment, tools, vehicles, raw materials, works-in-progress, and finished
product, each providing its own share of fair market value to the business. The sum of all
this is said to be equal to the value of the entire firm. The dollar value o f these so-called
tangible resources is more easily determined as a result o f known historical costs and
other similar arms-length transactions in the marketplace. There can, of course, still be
disagreements regarding economic value, and this is one reason, for example, why people
often ask for more than one appraisal when buying/selling property. The range of this
disagreement, however, typically is small when compared to the total value o f the
property. Chances are, if you own something that can be seen and touched, there are
knowledgeable people who, with the aid of many other transactions in the marketplace,
can accurately quantify the worth of your property in dollars.
Businesses, venture capitalists, and even typical stockowners (not to mention
government taxing authorities39) have in the last century come to realize that substantial

38
Traditional valuation methods also may recognize the value of “good will” or “going concern,”
although historically have lacked accurate ways to quantify these. The accounting profession will be
wrestling with these value issues more in the future because Federal Accounting Standards Board
promulgated FASB 142 that took effect in 2002.
39
See, American Bus. Info, v. Ear. 264 Neb. 574 (2002) and at
http://court.nol.org/opinions/2002/august/augl6/s01-470.htm.
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value can exist in things that are not tangible. Some of the most familiar examples of
intangible property (also referred to as intellectual capital or knowledge assets) are
patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights. Each of these carries with it a strategic
economic value to the business, and as such, has been recognized under law and
protected in some manner. The importance of intangible property is rapidly growing as a
result o f what some have called the New Economy. The value of so-called knowledge
property has in many people’s view outpaced the value tangible property.40
Intellectual property, like other kinds of property, also may be subject to loss in
value as a result of a terroristic threat, especially if the threat carried out. Consider
naming rights as an example. Everyone entering into a naming rights agreement is
hopeful that favorable impressions are generated as a result of the transaction.
Occasionally, though, some unforeseen problem or catastrophe can occur that risks
linking the corporate name with something negative and undesirable. A May 23, 2000
article written in the Charlotte Observer notes such a possibility:
In the 16 months since the Lowe’s home improvement chain paid $35
million o f the naming rights o f Charlotte Motor Speedway, debris from an Indy
racing wreck last May killed three fans and a pedestrian bridge that collapsed
injured more than 100 fans on Sunday.
The incidents at Lowe’s Motor Speedway mark the first time a sponsor’s
name has been affiliated with such tragedy since companies started buying the
naming rights to sports facilities almost 15 years ago, experts in the business say.
The tragedies should not tarnish Wilkesboro-based Lowe’s image, but
they will make other companies more cautious in future naming rights
agreements, experts said (Klaff 2000).

For example, on 08/21/02, Ameritrade (online brokerage service) lists Microsoft’s capitalization
as $280.8 billion while General Motors is shown as $26.7 billion (http://www.ameritrade.com).
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If a terroristic threat has enough credibility and is widely publicized, then some
consumers may begin to associate a CC/A name with the threat. Recall that most naming
rights contracts span a number of years. That is a long time to deal with public relations
damage if the name is continually associated with negative consequences.
LINKING THREAT TO LOSS
The attempt to link the threat of terror to specific losses is easy in concept but
difficult in practice. The level of difficulty turns on the level of proof required to
establish proximate causation, and on the nature of the threat itself. With regard to the
former, casual or anecdotally established causation may be a sufficient level o f proof for
purposes of internal use by the economic entity. If, however, recovery of damages is
sought in a legal forum, then USA law requires a stricter standard.
Legal Standards for Recovery of Damages
There are really two issues needing resolution in a damage recovery case:
In order for damages to be recoverable, they must be proximately caused
by the wrongful acts of the defendant. In addition, damages must be
proved within a reasonable degree o f certainty [italics sic]. A key word in
the latter phrase is “reasonable.” In applying the modifier reasonable, the
courts have acknowledged that it may not be possible to compute damages
with 100% certainty. Therefore, some degree of certainty less than 100%
is acceptable. Here the opinion testimony of an expert can be used to
establish the reasonable limits of acceptability. In allowing some level of
certainty less than 100%, courts recognize that, even for historical
damages, the actions of the defendant may have permanently changed
events so that one may never know exactly what would have transpired in
the absence of such actions (Gaughan 2000).
Finding proximate causation becomes more illusive as the directness and
credibility o f the threat wane. If, for example, a CC/A receives a direct threat from a
well-known terrorist group, and the threat is widely publicized, then revenues likely will
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drop sharply and in a manner rarely seen absent a threat. The infrequency of sharp drops
in revenue absent other explanations makes the link to causation easier.
Economic Uncertainty
Damages may occur in the context of stable, nascent, or unstable income streams.
Nascent and unstable income streams complicate both the proximate causation and
reasonable degree of certainty legal requirements. Under these conditions, the need for
expert testimony often is inescapable.
Revenue streams also occur in the broader context of the economy at large, local
business conditions, and specific conditions within the respective industry o f the
economic entity. With regard to the former, an example o f this impact can be seen by
recalling the condition of the hotel industry discussed in an earlier section. The USA and
European economy was softening even before the 9-11 event. While no doubt remains
9-11 had severe impacts on the hotel industry, the question is still out on what percentage
was caused by 9-11 versus what percentage was caused by a softening economy.
PREDICTING TERRORISM AND CONSEQUENCES
Future patterns o f typical crime often are predictable via past crime statistics. The
typical genre o f crime is repeated with frequency. Frequency of occurrence aids in
prediction. Crime statistics are nearly worthless, however, as a predictor o f terrorism
because terrorism is not typical. As can be seen in Figure 3 (Appendix A), less than ten
people were killed in North America during the five-year period between 1995 and 2000.
While other hints o f the impending, post 2000, the 9-11 attacks may have been available,
crime statistics certainly was not one of them.
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Another problem complicating prediction of terrorist acts is the target-rich
environment America offers. According to data from the USA population census taken
in 2000, the United States has 49 metropolitan areas with populations over 1,000,000,
and another 32 with populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000 41 Each o f these
metropolitan areas contains numerous large office buildings, heavily attended venues like
those of a CC/A, and geographically dispersed critical infrastructure, all o f interest to a
terrorist. Even knowing in advance that terrorists’ target selection process is heavily
based on ideology, predicting which specific target will be hit is more a matter of
guesswork.
Quantification of Risk
Stan Kaplan and John Garrick (1981) authored an often quoted article on risk
assessment that appears to be the prototype for much of the later research in the area of
risk management. They consider risk to be a function o f both probability and
consequence. Concisely stated, they believe the following three questions must be
answered to properly assess risk:
What can happen?
What are the chances of a happening?
If something happens, then what are the consequences?
Table 1 expresses this concept mathematically.

These figures were available as of 08/29/02 from the U.S. Census Bureau at:
http://factfinder.census.gov/biy lang=en vt name=DEC 2000 SF1 U GCTPH1R US10S geo id=01000
US.html
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Table 1
Kaplan and Garrick scenario, probability, and consequence list.
Scenario
51
52

Likelihood Consequence
p\
xl
p2
x2

SN
pN
xN
Using brackets to denote a set: R={<Si, pi, Xi>}, 1=1,2,...,N.
Source: adapted from Kaplan and Garrick (1981).

Kaplan and Garrick probably did not author this work with terrorism in mind, but their
work is nevertheless broadly applicable to all kinds of risk. 42
Gordon Woo also has provided significant research in the area of risk, specifically
with regard to natural catastrophes, and more recently, with terrorist threats 43 Woo
attempts divide risk factors into more manageable components:
In the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear installations, which
provides the methodological basis underlying insurance natural
catastrophe modeling (Woo 1999), and more recently civil aviation risk
modeling, the damage consequences of an initiating hazardous event are
logically charted via a multi-branch event-tree. The process o f
systematically dis-aggregating [sic] risk into component elements, through
an event-tree, is an important aspect of structuring a risk analysis (Woo
2002 ).
In constructing an event-tree, Woo notes that four conditional probabilities need to be
quantified:

We should assume any skillful terrorist has read the work of Kaplan and Garrick, and will plan
attacks accordingly.
43
For additional reading on natural catastrophe risk see: Woo, Gordon. 1999. The Mathematics o f
Natural Catastrophes. London: Imperial College Press.
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[1]
[2]
[3]

[4]

Given that an attack is planned, what is the probability that there is
some prior intelligence about it?
Given that an attack is planned, and there is some prior intelligence
about it, what is the probability that the intelligence is acted upon?
Given that an attack is planned, and either no intelligence exists or
else it is not acted upon, what is the probability that the attack is
nevertheless detected by border guards, police or other security
personnel?
Given that an attack is planned, but remains completely
undetected, what is the probability that it fails to cause significant
loss due to technical or logistical shortcomings (Woo 2002)?

In its simplest form, the use o f an event-tree is makes the complex appear
simplistic. Even the component decisions o f an event-tree, however, often require input
from respective experts especially since quantitative data may be missing or inaccurate.
Insurance Company Perspectives
The actuarial concepts of risk, as frequently utilized by the insurance industry,
offer another way to think about risk. General Cologne Re,44 a prominent reinsurer,
discusses three types o f risk:
1.

2.

3.

Process Risk - A measure o f dispersion of an actual/observed
outcome from a true mean value (or expected outcome). Example,
the odds that a coin tossed 100 times will produce 40 heads and 60
tails, when the expected outcome is 50/50.
Parameter Risk - A measure of dispersion of error in the
assumptions (parameters) about the mean. Example. Using the
coin toss example above, the observer may incorrectly assume a
“fair” coin, i.e., one not weighted to produce heads 40% of the
time.
Model Risk - A measure o f dispersion of error caused by not
knowing or understanding the loss process. Example: on the
1,000th toss, the coin lands and stands on its edge. In this case the

http://www.gcr.com
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observer did not “price” for a third possibility (Ferguson, Reindel
et al. 2002) 45
The 9-11 tragedy caused actuaries to rethink the concept o f risk. Insurance
companies, for example, often try to diversify their risk in much the same manner as
investors do with their stock portfolios. By insuring a portfolio o f many so-called
uncorrelated lines o f business, e.g., property coverage versus life insurance, insurance
companies have historically reduced the potential o f catastrophic loss. The 9-11 tragedy
changed that by encompassing an estimated 23 lines of insurance in one event (Ferguson,
Reindel et al. 2002). The 9-11 tragedy greatly reduced the potential value and security o f
using diversified product lines. The insurers did avoid having the 9-11 attack on the two
towers o f the WTC being classified as two events; instead, the court ruled it was one
event (Starkman 2002). This reduced the insurer's losses because coverage limits often is
by event.

In the interest of brevity, much of this quote was edited to reduce additional explanation of risk
concepts.
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METHODOLOGY
THE MORE SPECIFIC CASE
So far, most of the discussion in this research has been high-level and has, for the
most part, purposely avoided the specific case. The intent now is to enhance the
previously discussed conceptual framework of costing a terroristic threat by considering a
less-obtuse example. The example will, nevertheless, still be less than fully specified and
named for several reasons. First, no prudent economic entity would release much o f the
kind of data required for such an analysis for both security and competitive reasons.
Secondly, even if such data were available, the analysis would require professional
support resources far beyond the scope of this work. Lastly, even if all relevant data were
disclosed and all professional resources were available, many hypothetical assumptions
are required regarding the nature of the threat and its source. For these reasons,
discussion of an actual entity and actual threat is impractical. As was mentioned at the
beginning, a medium-sized CC/A in the Midwest will be used to illustrate cost issues.46
A generic CC/A example provides sufficient specification for this discussion.
This generic specification o f threat also is helpful for academic purposes. Unless
the range of possibilities arbitrarily is restricted, the estimation of probabilities and
outcomes, and subsequently relating these to cost, becomes unmanageable for purposes
of illustration. In this regard, we presume direct threat from a foreign source widely

A medium-sized CC/A is defined as being between 250,000 and 500,000 square feet in size. An
example of a large CC/A is the Anaheim Convention Center in California, which has 800,000 square feet.
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assumed to have requisite resources to carry out the threat47 The historical preference of
the source is explosives, but bioterrorism48 cannot be ruled out.
Moot Issues in the Current Scenario
In the absence o f a direct threat, one o f the first questions a CC/A should consider
is its relative desirability as a terrorist target. As was noted earlier, metropolitan areas
always contain many potential targets. The determination o f what to spend to counter a
potential threat turns in part by estimating, and subsequently ranking, target desirability
from the terrorist’s perspective. Many targets do not have the ideological fit terrorists
often prefer, or are sufficiently hardened to act as a deterrent. O f course, given the
presence of a direct threat, target desirability becomes a moot point and requires the
assumption of "desirable". Given the assumption that the CC/A is a desirable target, the
question no longer is whether to spend for defense above routine levels, but rather how
much to spend.
An analysis o f the terrorist’s ability to deliver an attack also is not required in this
scenario. With regard to foreign terrorists, a CC/A located in the Midwest theoretically is
harder to hit than one on the coast because o f the logistics in transporting dangerous
material over long distances. Whether the terrorist is foreign or domestic, if the source of

A direct threat in this context may be an expressed threat and/or those combinations of
circumstances and conditions synergistically summing to equate to the same threat potential as an
expressed threat. For example, a sequence of direct threats to CC/As in other regions may sum to equate a
direct threat on the prototypical Midwestern CC/A.
48
"Bioterrorism" is a broad category that includes chemical weapons (e.g., chlorine gas), a dirty
nuclear bomb (e.g., high explosives to create and disperse a radioactive cloud), disease (e.g., anthrax), and
infectious disease (e.g., small pox). In addition to not ruling out bioterrorism, the cost structure and
engineering difficulties associated with each delivery system may encourage bioterrorism.
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threat is known to have sufficient financial and other resources, their logistical barriers
are of less concern.
Lastly, and as discussed previously, estimating the cost of a threat involves many
professions; accounting, finance, economics, marketing, legal, actuarial, and security.
After a direct threat exists, however, the scope o f the actuarial and security professions
has a much narrower focus. A direct threat removes the need for prediction of threat.
The tasks that remain relate to estimation of the losses suffered after a successful attack
and estimation o f the costs of prevention.
CATEGORIES OF THREAT COST
Breaking the cost o f a threat into component parts may help to manage where and
how costs attach. These costs can be roughly divided into five categories as shown in
Table 2.
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Table 2
Categories o f Threat Cost.
1: Education/Information/Intelligence
hiring of specialized security professionals
information regarding source of threat
information regarding most-likely kind of threat (e.g. bomb?)

2: Control of Risk
legal advice
analysis of financial impact
liability

3: Defense
prevention
surveillance
security personnel
hardening

4: Contingency Costs
first-aid: inventory and delivery staff
crowd control

5: Loss of Revenue
fewer venues
lower attendance
increased advertising
structural damage
insurance cost

Efficient and effective security spending requires knowledge of potential sources
of threat, the methods of terror used by those sources, and intelligence regarding their
current condition or status. This knowledge is required to find and evaluate specific
sources o f weakness within the CC/A relating to those threats and methods. The CC/A
will rely heavily on security experts and public law enforcement entities to acquire this
knowledge.
As mentioned earlier, owners o f risk are at increased danger of incurring legal
liabilities. The probability of legal liabilities (as distinct from the probability o f the risk)
can be reduced by shifting the legal control o f risk to the customers of the CC/A, i.e., the
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venue organizers and their attendees. This is primarily done by disclosing specific
information about the threat. Such disclosure is likely to be private when given to the
organizers and will need to be public when given to the attendees.49 Note that shifting
the locus of risk increases the potential for lost revenues if organizers and/or attendees
avoid the CC/A. Accordingly, costs are rarely avoided in total.
Cost o f defense may be significantly offset by involving all levels of law
enforcement.50 Local, state, and federal enforcement agencies at a minimum can provide
advice, and often have access to intelligence regarding the source and modus operandi of
threat. In addition, given the political climate at the time of this writing in 2002, any
threat from a known terrorist would likely result in every level of government providing
significant protective surveillance and intelligence at no charge to the CC/A.51 The
amount o f protection offered also may increase if the economic importance o f the CC/A
or its venues are high for the local community or the nation.
Various contingency costs also are a moral and a legal requirement. These are the
costs associated with preparations to handle post-attack problems. Examples include, but
are not limited to, first-aid, crowd control, and containment of damage.
Even if the CC/A gives the organizer notice of the risk, that notice will not necessarily relieve the
CC/A of legal liability for attendees' losses if the CC/A should have known the organizer's response to the
notice of risk was insufficient. Additionally, even if the CC/A successfully transfers legal control of the
risk and legal liability for the risk to the organizer and/or the attendees, then the CC/A still can be assured
of being sued by all injured parties to verify that the transfer was successful. That litigation expense is an
unavoidable fixed cost of the CC/A.
50
Notification of legal authorities is an obvious moral requirement. The intent here is to note the
difference between legally required minimal reporting requirements and the solicitation of active
involvement. A free society leaks information like a sieve. If the CC/A makes a disclosure of a known risk
to local officials, then the CC/A should begin to expect unplanned public disclosures via rumor. Effective
public relations may require the CC/A to make some public disclosure so as to minimize pressures
generated by rumor. Soliciting active involvement of law enforcement is sure to come at a price no less
than coordination of public announcements.
51
This cost becomes a taxpayer-bom externality of the CC/A.
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Lastly, the there is a significant potential for loss of revenue. A list of possible
sources of loss is quite large. A few examples include fewer venues, lower average
attendance, and increased insurance cost (if available at all)52. If an attack is successfully
carried out, long-term damage to the physical structures of the CC/A also may impact
revenue streams.
Quantifying Costs Associated With Threat Categories
The process of categorizing threat costs makes the budgeting process more
manageable. At a high level, the methodology involves employing those experts
associated with each category o f cost with the goal of developing the most accurate
estimate possible. To this end, an approach similar to the event-tree discussed above may
prove helpful. In a previous section, W oo’s event-tree was discussed as an aid in
quantifying the chance of terrorists successfully inflicting major damage. The event-tree
concept can be reworked with the goal o f estimating cost. Such an example is shown in
Appendix C.

Problems concerning insurance availability are discussed later in a section entitled “Specific
Expense impacts.
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ANALYSIS
The discussion thus far has focused on the conceptual framework for costing a
threat. Of necessity, demonstrating with a real-world example is not practical because of
the paucity o f academically suitable examples, a lack of entities willing to disclose
information, and because of resource constraints. All o f this notwithstanding, a highlevel discussion with the goal o f getting closer to practical application is possible. One
obvious goal o f an entity facing a threat is to be able to predict the economic
consequences. To this end, any measuring tool may be o f value, including a heuristic.
COM PARATIVE IM PA CT
Ex ante consideration of costs associated with a terrorist threat begins with the
assumption of greater subjectivity, and consequently less precision, than an ex post
consideration. This, of course, is the result of the inherent inaccuracies in predicting
future cost versus having experienced historical costs. Therefore, from an ex ante
perspective, the management of a CC/A may consider using the ex post established loss
faced by a like entity in like circumstances as a rough guide of what is to come. The
likelihood o f finding a like entity in like circumstances, however, is low. Note especially
the small number o f direct, credible threats received by U.S. entertainment facilities or
even foreign based entertainment facilities.53 If terrorist efforts are more successful than
counterterrorist efforts, then the problem o f lack of comparable entities/circumstances
may change on a going-forward basis.

53
On Wednesday, 10/23/02, about 40 Chechen gunmen burst into a theatre in Moscow and took an
audience of about 700 hostage. Russian President Vladimir Putin linked the attack to a broader offensive
by Islamic militants connected to the al Qaeda terrorist network (Chazan and Whalen 2002).
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As o f Fall, 2002, the best available comparison, which perhaps is Super Bowl
XXXVI, is insufficient for all the reasons discussed earlier.54 Nevertheless, recall
security costs were rumored to be double that o f previous years. For an informationstarved CC/A facing a threat, the ex post Super Bowl XXXVI security costs may be of
some marginal value for planning and budgeting even though they are at best a heuristic,
order-of-magnitude estimate.
THREATS AND THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Conventional wisdom holds that entertainment-related expenses (i.e., luxury
goods) are more severely impacted during a bad economy than required staples (i.e.,
necessities) (McConnell and Brue, 1993). Being aware of several key economic
indicators, especially those relating to income and spending habits, may prove useful in
predicting losses or gains not only in a nonthreat environment, but also in a threat
environment. Consumer reaction to a threat may, for example, work synergistically with
a worsening economy to worsen consequences. Conceptually, the possibility exists
consumer reaction to the effects of a terrorist threat may be different depending on the
value o f economic indicators such as the rate of employment and median income levels.
More research is needed in this area, especially with regard to establishing the elasticity
between economic conditions and consumer reaction to a threat.
PREDICTABLE VERSUS NON-PREDICTABLE COSTS
In addition to the event-tree concept discussed earlier, there may be additional
value in sorting costs based on predictability. Upon the receipt of a threat, some costs are

See footnotes 13 through 15.
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nascent. In other words, these are costs that did not and would not exist in the pre-threat
environment. Examples o f these costs are those related to acquiring intelligence and
information about the source of the threat and the hiring o f additional security experts and
personnel. The issue o f whether these costs are fixed or reoccurring is less important for
this discussion than the issue o f predictability. Even in an ex ante setting, the CC/A may
be able to predict some o f the nascent costs with greater precision than other costs such as
revenue stream impacts. Many security-related commodities, for instance, are in a
standardized product form and available at known costs.
Referring again to Appendix C, those costs in the box labeled
“Education/Information/Intelligence” likely are the most predictable. All other costs
depend to some degree on costs in the box labeled “Loss o f Revenue”. The prediction of
loss o f revenue is really a prediction o f consumer behavior. Consumer behavior often has
been shown to be unpredictable. Therefore, for the conservative spender, there may be a
tendency toward too little spending in the control of risk, defense, and contingencies.
This may be less than ideal if such costs are perceived to threaten the economic health, or
especially solvency, o f the entity. Establishing accurate prediction o f revenue impacts
from a threat is perhaps the most critical and yet subjective o f the cost components.
Feedback from every available expert and data source is indicated.
SPECIFIC REVENUE IMPACS
Lost Revenue
Lost revenue can take many forms. Perhaps the most obvious form of lost
revenue is lower attendance at all or most CC/A events. Fewer bookings o f conventions
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likely is another problem. Lastly, there may be problems drawing professional sports
teams or even local collegiate teams. All o f this may work to create large blocks o f time
where facilities go unused. Lower attendance at existing events, fewer conventions, and
fewer collegiate or professional sports teams also creates the problem o f lower
concession sales.
To compound problems, some security costs may not be scaleable to smaller
crowds. This is especially true if the CC/A has a security firm under contract and that
contract was written under the premise o f full occupancy. In this circumstance, the CC/A
will pay the same fees regardless o f the occupancy rate.
Additional Advertising
Advertising associated with a CC/A is done at several different levels, not all o f
which are directly orchestrated and funded by the CC/A itself In addition to direct
advertising by the CC/A, advertising may be undertaken by the public authority
associated with the CC/A, affiliated sports teams, convention event sponsors, and perhaps
even vendors. CC/As also are the beneficiary of free advertising as scheduled events are
often mentioned by the media as part of their news service. The revenue-impacting
reductions in utilization discussed in the previous section also have as a consequence a
reduction in advertising. To counteract this reduction, the CC/A likely will have
additional out-of-pocket advertising expense to make up for advertising typically not
bom directly by the CC/A.
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Naming Rights Devaluation
If the CC/A has not yet signed a naming rights deal, then the value of those rights
likely will drop. If the rights have already been sold, then the holder of those rights likely
will face a reduction in the benefits those rights produce. Part o f the value from a naming
rights deal, for example, includes value gained from ad impressions.55 Although
establishing the value o f ad impressions is a complicated process involving a high degree
of subjectivity, ad impressions are, nevertheless, thought to genetically engender positive
feelings toward the sponsor of the ads, as well as increase the likelihood o f consumers
purchasing their products/services. Lower attendance equates to fewer ad impressions.
SPEC IFIC EXPENSE IM PACTS
The Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) recently conducted
two surveys o f their members regarding various issues concerning security.56 Both
surveys are related to the terrorist threat.
Insurance Survey
This survey identifies a serious insurance problem related to terrorism. One
quarter o f the respondents were unable to obtain insurance at any cost. O f the remaining

An ad impression is the presumed positive response gained when a marketer presents a company
or product in an advertising context. This context may include ad exposure generated through radio,
television, newspaper, signage, etc. Many ad impressions, for example, are generated by having a
company’s name or logo displayed on in prominent places within the CC/A.
56
BOMA is a real estate organization whose stated purpose is to enhance the human, intellectual and
physical assets of the commercial real estate industry through advocacy, education, research, standards and
information. Information in this section borrows heavily from these surveys. The survey relating to
security is available at the BOMA website. The survey relating to insurance is not available at the site but
was available via a subscription email from Elevator World. Elevator World is an international news
provider for issues relating to vertical transportation. The BOMA website is located at:
http://www.boma.org/index.htm
The Elevator World website is located at:
http://www.elevator-world.com
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respondents who were able to obtain insurance, 80% reported higher premiums, caps on
coverage, higher deductibles, cancellation clauses, and exclusions for chemical,
biological, and radiological acts.
Even though a CC/A may be paying higher premiums, a direct terrorist threat may
trigger a cancellation clause and force the CC/A to self insure. Public knowledge o f this
situation may further reduce attendance as public perception develops that the CC/A is
unable to bear the cost of risk.
Security Survey
The respondents to the security survey indicated a greater concern for overall
emergency preparedness than with terrorism.
Survey respondents indicated far more concern with overall emergency
preparedness than with terrorism. For instance, 56.9 percent of the
respondents indicated security concerns over fire safety; 34.7 percent were
concerned with civil unrest; and 32.7 percent identified power disruptions
as a major concern. In comparison, only 11.9 percent acknowledged
terrorist attacks as a potential threat, and 6.9 percent had concerns
regarding biohazards. “Being prepared in general ... appears to be more
important than concern over ‘one time’ or ‘unlikely’ events,” the report
says (The Building Owners and Managers Association and Institute 2002).
Presumably, the 6 .9% o f managers concerned with biohazards is a subset of the 11.9%
who consider terrorist attacks as a potential threat, or else a question is raised as to the
expected source o f the biohazards. An interesting additional survey question would have
been to ask respondents about these issues within the context of a direct, credible threat.
The BOMA report also provides typical examples o f expense as a result of the
9-11 threat, as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Security Measures in Place Before and After 9-11

Security Measures

Had in Place
Prior to 9-11

Added After
Events of 9-11

74.3%
41.1%
14.9%
64.9%
42.6%
52.0%
80.2%

6.9%
6.9%
5.9%
5.4%
5.0%
15.8%
5.9%

Did Not
Have in
Place or Add
After 9-11
18.3%
48.0%
74.3%
28.7%
50.5%
30.7%
13.4%

60.9%
1.5%

5.9%
4.0%

32.2%
69.3%

Lobby Security Controls
ID Cards For All Tenants
Perimeter Barriers
Surveillance Cameras
Garage Security
Vendor Security Protection
Alarm Monitors
Employee Background
Checks
Other

No
Answer
0.5%
4.0%
5.0%
1.0%
2.0%
1.5%
0.5%
1.0%
25.2%

Adapted from a BOMA security report (The Building Owners and Managers Association
and Institute 2002)

The same BOMA survey goes on to list the ten major categories o f likely 2002
new/expanded security expenses:
- Increasing the number and/or upgrading the quantity of security cameras
throughout the interior and surrounding the exterior of the buildings.
- Increasing the number and/or upgrading the quantity of security cameras
throughout the interior and surrounding the exterior of the buildings.
- Reviewing, updating and/or expanding emergency planning and
evacuation procedures.
- Increasing the number of security personnel.
- Adding identification cards for vendors and tenants.
- Adding, expanding and/or enforcing key card access systems.
- Implementing a more rigorous security system (i.e., “no more
exceptions”).
- Eliminating loading-dock parking and after-hours deliveries.
- Expanding security training for all property employees.
- Restricting access to various building areas to all but authorized
personnel.
- Implementing new security procedures in and around the mail room/mail
center area(s).
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Likely, this list was generated without the specific precondition of a direct threat,
and consequently would be expected to grow in such a circumstance. Note too,
establishing cost for these categories of expense is heavily influenced by the scale and
architectural design o f the facility. Cost also may be impacted by the speed of
implementation required. The “rush job” that a threat necessitates likely will drive up
implementation costs.
OFFSETS
In the event a threat is successfully carried out, many costs will undoubtedly be
partially offset through the contributions and volunteerism o f the community and
charitable organizations, and perhaps government. This was demonstrated after the 9-11
event. Unfortunately, the amount o f these offsets can not be predicted in advance, and
will not be fully known until long after the incident.
This kind o f cost offset is not widely available before an incident occurs. Law
enforcement may be one o f the few "free" material sources o f help available prior to a
threat being carried out. For obvious reasons, the terrorist threat does not lend itself to
the same kind of proactive volunteerism that, say, a hurricane does.
Minor adjustments to the marketing plan also may be helpful. Presumably,
organizations, like people, differ as to their risk tolerance o f terrorism. Focusing a
marketing plan to those who are less risk averse may increase the percentage of
successful sales contacts. Historically, risk aversion is not a typical trait marketers seek
to quantify.
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For that segment of convention business expressly leaving because of a threat, the
CC/A may be able to offer one o f several cyber solutions. For example, Software
Management, Inc. has filed for a patent for a system purported to conduct conventions,
events, conferences, trade shows, and meetings via internet-based facilities.57 This kind
o f hosting can be completely virtual or allow the convention sponsor's programs, held
within a real CC/A, to be viewed remotely. Although margins for this kind o f solution
are predictably much lower than a face-to-face convention experience, some profit may
be better than no profit.
In the recent aftermath of 9-11, the hospitality industry ran many ads appealing to
the courage and patriotism o f USA citizens with the goal o f restimulating demand. Such
an ad campaign may work to offset losses, however, often it is unclear in advance
whether ad expense is greater than revenue from restimulated demand.

57

http ://www. conventionnet. com/about help, cfm
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CONCLUSION
Predictability of cost of a terrorist threat ex ante involves a number of subjective
inputs. The amount o f actual cost that unfolds depends on many factors which are
primarily, but not exclusively, functions of source of threat, directness o f threat, and
consumer response to threat. There is a lack o f structure in the linkage o f these functions
in the sense no hard rules have been found (e.g., if A, then B) to aid in the process of
quantification.
Part of the quantification problem undoubtedly stems from a lack o f experience in
handling terrorist problems, especially from foreign sources. Historically, the USA has
been shielded from foreign-based terrorist events because of two surrounding oceans and
the logistical problems that causes for terrorists. The relative declining costs o f
transportation and communication, however, as well as an expanding openness in society
has reduced this shielding affect. If a large number of terrorist events had occurred, then
perhaps cost patterns would emerge, thus enhancing predictability o f cost. If
counterterrorism measures are successful, as would obviously be the preferred case, then
experience may never be gained.
The lack o f terrorist events inspires a cost-related discussion to note several areas
where more research is needed. First among these is consumer reaction to threat. What
are the typical drivers of behavior for consumers facing a threat? Can they be predicted
with sufficient accuracy, especially in the context of varying economic conditions? In
addition, if terrorist events increase, then will a pattern of diminishing marginal returns
evolve for the terrorist, or will consumer response increase drastically in a more direct
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relationship? What is ideal ratio o f public versus private funding to handle terrorist
threats?
The cost issue is not just an academic problem, but also has policy-related
components. Can changes in public and private economic/political policy, for example,
impact the number o f occurrences o f terrorist events and reduce the need for large
security budgets? On October 11, 2002, the USA Congress voted overwhelmingly to
authorize U.S. military operations against Iraq, granting broad new powers to the
president to confront and disarm Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Kelly and Thompson
2002).58 As o f this writing, a war is not yet imminent, but if a war does ensue, what
consequences can be expected as related to the domestic terrorist threat?
Despite the lack o f available terrorist events to study, one fact appears obvious.
Terrorist threats are expensive and represent a substantial economic threat to those who
face them. An increase in terrorist events will undoubtedly require a broader public
policy plan for dealing with the economic consequences.

Evidence has been widely presented by the USA, Israel, and England showing Saddam Hussein to
be a supporter of terrorism and be in the possession of chemical and biological weapons of mass
destruction. The status of Hussein’s nuclear capability is not known as of this writing.
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Appendix A: Terrorist Attack Statistics59

Figure 1: Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1981 - 2000
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Figure 2: Total International Attacks by Region, 1995 - 2000. (Note: North America
had casualties only in 1997 and 1999.)

All figures in Appendix A were adapted from material produced by the United States Department
of State located at:
http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/pgtrDt/2000/2451 .htm
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Figure 3: Total International Casualties by Region. (Note: North America had no
casualties during the period except for 1997.)
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Figure 4: Total Facilities Struck by International Attacks.
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Figure 5: Total US Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks.
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Appendix B
Acronyms Defined

9-11
ABC
BOMA
C&C
CC/A
ELF
FASB
FDA
GDP
HAMAS
IMF
IP
IRR
ISO
IT
NFL
NPV
NSSE
NYC
PETA
PRA
PTSD
URL
USA
WTC

September 11, 2001 and its consequences
American Broadcasting Corporation
The Building Owners and Managers Association
command and control (also C2)
Convention Center/Arena
Earth Liberation Front
Federal Accounting Standards Board
U.S.A. Food and Drug Administration
Gross Domestic Product
Islamic Resistance Movement
International Monetary Fund
intellectual property
internal rate o f return
Insurance Services Office
information technology
National Football League
net present value
National Special Security Events
New York City
People of the Ethical Treatment of Animals
probability risk assessment
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Universal Resource Locator
United States o f America
former World Trade Center in New York
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Appendix C
Cost Event Tree

Education/Information/Intelligence
Given a threat is received, itemize costs pertaining to:
- hiring of specialized security professionals
- information regarding source of threat
- information regarding most-likely kind of threat (e.g. bomb?)

Given the results above show the threat is credible, subsequent
decisions require multidisciplinary input The cost of that
input can be apportioned by category of threat.

Control of Risk
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- legal advice
- analysis of financial impact
- liability

Contingency Costs
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- crowd control planning
- first aid
- damage containment

Loss of Revenue
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- marketing expert’s estimate of lost business
- fewer venues
- lower average attendance
- loss or reduced use of physical structures
- may require economic expert

Defense
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- security expert
- prevention
- surveillance
- security personnel
- hardening

